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What is religious violence and why is it relevant to us? This may seem like an odd question, for
surely we can easily identify it, especially considering the events of 9/11 and other instances of
violence in the name of religion over the past decade or so? Of course, it is relevant not just
because of acts done in the name of religion but also because many observers find violence
involving religious followers or justified by religious ideologies especially disturbing. But such a
notion is based on an overall assumption that religions are, or should be, inherently peaceful and
harmonious, and on the modern Western ideal of a separation of religion and politics. As one
scholar opined, religious ideologies are particularly dangerous since they are “a powerful
resource to mobilize individuals and groups to do violence (whether physical or ideological
violence) against modern states and political ideologies.”1 But are such assumptions tenable? Is a
determination toward self-sacrifice, often exemplified by suicide bombers, a unique aspect of
violence motivated by religious doctrines? In order to understand the concept of “religious
violence,” we must ask ourselves what it is that sets it apart from other violence. In this essay, I
will discuss the notion of religious violence in the premodern Japanese setting by looking at a
number of incidents involving Buddhist temples.2
My goal is to address two specific questions. Is there a “religious warfare,” where battles and
skirmishes are fought with weapons and strategies fundamentally different from other kinds of
violent confrontations? And, what was the ideological setting within which such “religious
violence” occurred? While I am interested in the larger question of ideological justifications for
violence, I do not intend to make sweeping generalizations or address cases across the globe and
the span of history in this brief essay, but I will nevertheless make occasional comparisons to
relevant cases to the extent that it may help contextualizing violence. In either case, an introduc-
1. James Wellman, introduction to conference on “Religion, Conflict and Violence: Exploring Patterns Past and Present East &
West,” May 13-14, 2004, University of Washington; http://depts.washington.edu/eacenter/spring_0304.shtml.
2. Though my focus in this essay is on discourses of violence involving clerics in premodern Japan, I am drawing from my The
Teeth and Claws of the Buddha: Monastic Warriors and Sōhei in Japanese History (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii
press, 2007).
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tion to the framework and character of monastic violence in premodern Japan will be useful
before addressing its strategic features and intellectual contexts.
Monastic Violence in the Premodern Japanese Setting
The Buddhism that was imported to and eventually adopted in Japan was influenced by the
Chinese and Korean settings from which it came. As one might expect, the Japanese codes for
the behavior of monks and nuns reflected experiences on the continent, where temples had been
involved in political and military struggles.3 The codes thus stipulated that Buddhist members
were prohibited from killing, stealing, keeping and reading military manuals, forming rambunc-
tious bands, and receiving weapons.4 These rules would obviously not have been proclaimed had
there not been cases of monastics engaging in these activities on the continent to begin with. In
other words, there was never a “pure stage” or a “golden age” for Buddhism, when everyone
followed the rules against killing or stuck strictly to the monastic rules. Rather, it seems clear
that many precepts were adjusted or simply not followed in practice, and that it was for that
reason that governments from early on issued specific laws and edicts for Buddhist clerics. It is
important to note, however, that these laws were not mainly based on Buddhist doctrines but
rather on the perspective of the government, which desired no challenges from the only orga-
nized religious and political powers beside itself.
And yet, in Japan these laws proved insufficient as well, as indicated by the occasional notice
in early records. One account dating to 624, noted in the early eighth century chronicle the Nihon
shoki (Chronicles of Japan, 720), mentions that a monk struck his paternal grandfather with an
axe, which induced the court to expel all Buddhist adherents in Japan. Eventually, however, a
memorial from a Paekche monk is said to have persuaded the nobles not to carry out their plans.5
Interestingly, despite criticism of such incidents, there are also examples of monks participating
in wars at the request of the imperial court. For instance, in 764, we learn that monk novices
were part of the government army that defeated the rebelling Emi no Oshikatsu (706–764),
though it is unclear in what capacity they participated.6
3. The best known example on the continent is the Shaolin monastery, which supported the Tang rulers against remnants of the
Sui Dynasty in battles in 620–621 (Meir Shahar, “Epigraphy, Buddhist Hagiography and Fighting Monks,” 15–21).
4. Ryō no gige, “Sōni ryō,” article 1, in Shintei zōho kokushi taikei, vol. 22, p. 81; Hirata Toshiharu, Sōhei to bushi (Tokyo:
Nihon kyōbunsha, 1965), 16–19; Hioki Eigō, Sōhei no rekishi: Hō to yoroi wo matotta ara hosshi tachi (Tokyo: Heibonsha,
1934), 51–52.
5. W. G. Aston, Nihongi: Chronicles of Japan from the earliest Times to A.D. 697, 152–153. See also Nihon shoki, part two, in
Shintei zōho kokushi taikei, 164–165.
6. Shoku Nihongi, Tenpyō jingo 2 (766) 9/6.
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Other records reveal sporadic outbursts of violence within monastic compounds throughout
the Nara (710–784) and early Heian (794–1185) eras, but it is first in the mid- tenth century that
we begin to see an increase and an intensification of armed conflicts. We note, for example, that
menial workers from the imperial temple of Tōdaiji rioted in 935, though they were eventually
subdued by an imperial police captain.7 In 959, a dispute in Kyoto between Gion’s Kanjin’in
(under Enryakuji control) and Kiyomizudera (a branch of Kōfukuji) resulted in brawls that
similarly induced the imperial court to dispatch imperial police captains to arrest the violators.8
But, it is perhaps the Tendai monk Ryōgen (912–985), who has come to embody the challenges
and opportunities with the presence of armed monastics in the tenth century more than anyone
else.9 Ryōgen’s intellectual ability was recognized at a young stage, as he was appointed to
prestigious religious debates when he was still in his twenties, though it also meant that he had
adversaries from other schools.10 In 966, he was appointed Tendai head abbot and immediately
proceeded, with the support of allies from the powerful Fujiwara family, to rebuild several
buildings on Mt. Hiei that had been damaged in fires or suffered from a lack of maintenance. 
Then, in 970, he issued a set of regulations for the monastic complex on Mt. Hiei. Consisting
of 26 articles, it is one of the richest and most important documents of the tenth century, reflect-
ing both Ryōgen’s concerns and ideals. Relevant to the discussion here are two articles that
specifically condemn the presence of rowdy and armed monks within the monastic complex. At
the same time, Ryōgen’s tenure was one of expansion as Enryakuji gained control over the Gion
complex in Kyoto, while solidifying his branch’s grip of the head abbotship in competition with
monks from Onjōji, which even earned Ryōgen a reputation of promoting the use of arms.11 Be
that as it may, the late tenth century was clearly a time when weapons were used to extend and
protect privileges within as well as outside monastic complexes, and while the court by and large
disproved of the arming of clerics, its own stance varied depending on the circumstances. In 982,
for example, the court actually encouraged members of the Onjōji faction, which it was now
supporting, to station armed guards at their residences to deter and protect from possible attacks
by Enryakuji supporters.12
7. Chōya gunsai, in DNS 1:6, Shōhei 5 (935) 6/31 (p. 921).
8. Nihon kiryaku, Tentoku 3 (959) 3/13; DNS 1:10, 539.
9. For a comprehensive study of Ryōgen and his times, see Paul Groner’s Ryōgen and Mt. Hiei (Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, 2001).
10. See for example, Jie daisōjō den, in Gunsho ruijū, vol. 4, p. 15; DNS 1:6, 146. 11 DNS, 1:13, Tenroku 1 (970) 7/16 (p. 213);
Groner, xii, 358–359.
11. DNS, 1:13, Tenroku 1 (970) 7/16 (p. 213); Groner, xii, 358–359.
12. Fusō ryakki, Tengen 5 (982) 1/10; Groner, Ryōgen and Mt. Hiei, 221–222.
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Ryōgen’s articles notwithstanding, armed members became increasingly prominent in conflict
resolution. But this increase in violence was not unique to religious institutions, as mid-Heian
Japan was a society where military power came to play a more important role both locally and
centrally. In the capital, the most significant event during the tenth century was the so-called
Anna Incident of 969, when the Fujiwara chieftain eliminated his opponents with the help of the
military commander Minamoto no Mitsunaka (912–997), famously known as the “teeth and
claws of the Fujiwara.”13 Still, it is at the local arena where the changes appear most drastic in
the tenth century.
Opportunistic governors and other provincial officials used appointments to enrich themselves
by raising taxes or adding other dues, often allying themselves with local strongmen to achieve
their goals. There are too many cases to note them all here, but suffice it to mention the well-
known 988 “Petition of the District Officials and Local Notables of Owari Province” (Owari no
kuni gunji haykushō ra gebumi), where the governor was accused of mismanagement. In a thirty-
one article long complaint, the local residents charged the governor with unjustly raising taxes,
changing the exchange rate between silk and rice to increase his own profit, and with forcing
local notables to raise and provide horses in excess of custom for the delivery of taxes to the
capital. The petition served its purpose as the governor was dismissed, but it did not stop other
appointees from engaging in the same kind of behavior. In fact, from 970 to 1041, we know of
no less than eighteen grievances of the same kind, only six of which resulted in dismissals of the
accused provincial officials.14
Local violence indicated an inability of the court to control the provinces solely with the help
of laws and edicts, and though it worked on occasion, the court had little choice but to find ways
to co-opt the emerging warriors in the countryside lest it lose control entirely. What the Kyoto
elites spearheaded was an ingenious transformation in which formerly bureaucratic functions and
relationships were privatized, put squarely in the hands of the individual elites and their closest
retainers. They thus managed to create a tightly knit hierarchy, tying estates and provinces
directly to the capital, without the intervention of officials appointed by a court often lacking an
understanding if the appointee was suited or not. The main tool in this process was the expansion
of private estates, or shōen, which came to serve as effective links between the capital elites and
local strongmen, between capital and countryside, securing income at a predictable level for
13. Adolphson, The Teeth and Claws, 34; Kuroda Toshio, Jisha seiryoku: mō hitotsu chūsei no shakai (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten,
1976), 33.
14. Charlotte von Verschuer, “Life of Commoners in the Provinces,” in Mikael Adolphson, Edward Kamens and Stacie
Matsumoto, eds., Heian Japan, Centers and Peripheries (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2007), 305–328.
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those comprising the Heian state.
This deliberate relaxation of the state’s direct control over the provinces was done out of need,
offering armed administrators and provincial strongmen a share of the income and an appoint-
ment that could be passed on to later generations, while allowing the Kyoto elites to stay in
control. For local strongmen, it also meant an opportunity to receive protection afforded, as
opposed to disengaging land entirely from the capital elites, which would have left them open to
other local challenges. For farmers, this might seem like bad news, but in fact, it gave them more
options. They could become part of a private estate with clear expectations of dues and a secure
tenure of their land and appointment, or they could stay on provincial lands, where conditions
might actually have improved because of the availability of a more attractive option. In either
case, the privatization of land benefitted enough people that the system lasted well into the
fifteenth century.
Often overlooked by scholars, the tenth century was an important turning point in Japan’s
classical age—in a recent collaborative work described as “something of a quiet watershed”—
when the imperial court, facing challenges in the countryside, made important adjustments to
maintain its supremacy.15 The result was an ingenious system of shared income and responsibili-
ties in which capital and provincial leaders co-operated to control land and income from it. The
drawback to this privatization was a factionalization in the capital where the elites now came to
compete with one another for land and retainers in the provinces. And as factionalism became a
more pronounced factor in court politics, the elites in the capital area moved away from a
political and social system that relied exclusively on a bureaucratic framework. So, while the
adjustments that were made allowed for more direct and effective ties between the emerging
local powers and individual noble houses, they also carried with them a new element of violence.
It is in this context that nobles and temples created and came to rely on their own networks of
resources and supporters in the disproportionately intensified cultural and socio-political compe-
tition in the Kinai.
The Nature of Monastic Violence
Violence involving clerics was closely tied to general social, political, economic and military
developments of the mid-Heian age. By the late eleventh and twelfth centuries, confrontations
over land and appointments had become commonplace among armed retainers of the capital
15. Mikael Adolphson, Edward Kamens & Stacie Matsumoto, Heian Japan, Centers and Peripheries (Honolulu, HI: University
of Hawaii press, 2007), 3.
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elites, including religious institutions. Overall, the patterns of conflict were identical between
nobles and among competing temples, centering mainly on two issues: rank and appointments,
and land and branch institutions. One was thus tied to social and political standing, while the
other was a matter of human and material resources. A few examples of each kind will be useful
in offering a sense of what religious institutions and clerics considered worth fighting for.
In the socio-political arena, the aforementioned competition between Enryakuji and Onjōji, the
Tendai siblings, stands out as one of the earliest and simultaneously most enduring. The contest
dates to the ninth century when the two lineages emerged, eventually resulting in a physical
separation with Enryakuji spread out on Mt. Hiei and Onjōji settled on the eastern foot of the
mountain. However, the physical separation was not accompanied by an ideological one, and so
the two branches continued to compete for titles and the headship of the school throughout the
Heian and Kamakura periods. For example, in 1038–39, the Fujiwara chieftain—then in control
of the imperial court as regent—supported the appointment of an Onjōji monk to head Tendai,
but he was eventually pressured to appoint someone from the Enryakuji complex instead.16
Having failed on numerous occasions to control Tendai through its abbotship, the Onjōji
clergy eventually resorted to seeking a clean separation by appealing for an independent ordina-
tion platform. Such requests were occasionally supported by members of the imperial court who
wished to weaken Enryakuji’s control of ceremonies and assets, such as retired emperors (in) in
the twelfth century. Go-Shirakawa (1127–1192, r. 1155–1158, in 1158–1192), for instance,
favored Onjōji and even seemed to grant it an independent platform in 1161 when he announced
that he would receive his initiation at an Onjōji branch. Enryakuji protested and pressured Go-
Shirakawa to attend a scaled down ritual. However, the next year he struck back by appointing
an Onjōji monk head abbot of Tendai, which further exacerbated the tensions between the two
branches.17
It is no exaggeration to state that the insei period (rule by retired emperors, 1086–1185), when
forceful retired emperors attempted to gain more direct control of religious appointment and
temple assets, was particularly intense in terms of monastic violence. Go-Shirakawa likely
imitated his great-grandfather Shirakawa (1053–1129, r. 1072–1086, in 1086–1129), who was
especially active in this area, appointing his own allies to numerous ceremonies and abbotships
while ignoring precedent. In 1102, for example, Shirakawa suspended the Kōfukuji head abbot
Kakushin (1065–1121) following disputes over land and an earlier appointment of his own
16. Adolphson, The Gates of Power, 64–65.
17. Sankaiki, Eiryaku 2 (1161) 4/7–9; Tendai zasu ki, 95; Hyakurenshō, Ōhō (1162) int. 2/1.
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protégé for an important ceremony. The Nara clergy reacted by attacking the mansion of Shi-
rakawa’s protégé, eventually forcing the retired emperor to reinstate Kakushin.18 Six years later,
Shirakawa upset the Tendai clergy by appointing a favored Shingon monk to perform a cer-
emony at Sonshōji, one of the imperially sponsored temples in the eastern part of the capital.
This appointment had rotated among monks from Onjōji, Enryakuji and Tōji, but Shirakawa
attempted to give the latter additional favor through this ceremony. Despite their frequent
animosity, the two Tendai centers protested together in a rare display of solidarity, causing great
commotion in the capital in anticipation of a confrontation. The protest took place peacefully and
Shirakawa had his way, but the noble members of the imperial court agreed that the retired
emperor had indeed broken precedent.19
Control of branch temples and shrines frequently took the form of appointment conflicts, but
they were ultimately concerned with the assets that each branch provided in terms of estates and
human resources. A particularly telling example involves Kōfukuji, the Fujiwara clan temple,
and Enryakuji. In 1113, Shirakawa had a certain Ensei (n.d.) appointed abbot of Kiyomizudera, a
prominent temple in the eastern hills of Kyoto.
However, Ensei was a monk with affiliation to Enryakuji and Kiyomizudera was, as noted
above, a branch temple of Kōfukuji, which decided to launch a protest in the capital. As a result,
another monk was appointed, which in turn prompted the Enryakuji clergy to attack Kiyomizud-
era. The destruction was substantial and there were a few fatalities. Kōfukuji demanded that the
Enryakuji perpetrators be punished, but the court was unable to agree on a judgment, in part
because its own members made the decision that caused the discord in the first place. Dissatis-
fied with the lack of action, Kōfukuji assembled armed supporters from both the temple com-
pound and various estates in the Nara region. In response, Enryakuji clerics prepared to engage
the approaching opponents, but at this point, the court finally acted by sending out a force led by
a seasoned warrior named Taira no Masamori (?–1121). A confrontation ensued where some
forty Kōfukuji followers were killed as opposed to only two among the government warriors.20
To note one more example, let us turn to Tōnomine, a temple-shrine complex located east of
Nara in Yamato Province. It was a highly contested center since it supposedly housed the
remains of the Fujiwara progenitor, Kamatari (614–669), but the temple had been established by
18. Chūyūki, Kōwa 4 (1102) 8/6, 8, 12, 15, 18, 21, 23, 26, 9/4, 5, 28, 29, 10/9, 17; DNS 3:6, 517–519, 534–544, 556–558, 584–
586, 601–605.
19. Chūyūki, Tennin 1 (1108) 3/20, 23, 30, 4/2; DNS 3:10, 112–114, 123–124.
20. Denryaku, Eikyū 1 (1113) int. 3/20, 21, 22, 29, 4/1; Chōshūki, Eikyū 1/int. 3/20, 21, 22, 4/1, 30, 5/4; DNS 3:14, 137–140,
145–147, 179–180, 182–183, 185; Tendai zasu ki, 77–78. See also Adolphson, The Teeth and Claws, 38–39.
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a Tendai monk, so both Kōfukuji and Enryakuji made claims to Tōnomine as a branch. The
imperial court, under the leadership of Fujiwara no Michinaga (966–1027), had recognized
Enryakuji’s rights to the center, but since it was located in Yamato, the Kōfukuji clergy repeat-
edly poked at it to dislodge it from Enryakuji control. In 1072, Kōfukuji decided to erect new
tollgates in Yamato, some of which impeded the flow of traffic to and from Tōnomine, whose
clergy reacted by tearing one of them down. In retaliation, members of the Kōfukuji clergy
charged Tōnomine itself on several occasion, burning down much of the center. The court made
a number of efforts to deal with the perpetrators, but the clergy resisted by not appearing in the
capital. When the aggressive clerics finally did agree to come to Kyoto, they threatened to bring
the entire clergy with them, indicating that they considered themselves protected by the divine
right of Yamashina dōri (discussed more in detail below), according to which a unanimous
clergy was considered to be justified in their actions by the gods. The court saw little choice but
to hand down mainly symbolic punishments and to implore the clergy to refrain from attacking
Tōnomine.21
It would seem, then, that the violent clerics considered their actions justified and that the court
did not argue against it. And whereas there was little by way of condemnation among contempo-
rary nobles and monks, there has been no lack of criticism by modern scholars. As I will argue
below, however, there was nothing that set this violence apart in terms of what the clerics fought
for, their ideological justification, who fought or how they fought. Let us turn to the latter two
before addressing the ideological context.
Monastic Warriors and Warfare
The twentieth century representation of monastic forces has, as I have argued elsewhere, focused
on the largely fictive figure of the sōhei (僧兵 ), or “monk-warriors.” Drawing from artistic
representations from the fourteenth century, this image first emerges as a coherent literary
concept in the early Tokugawa age, but was likely imported in the late sixteenth century from
Korea when Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s forces encountered fierce resistance from Korean “monk-
warriors” (sungbyŏng). Thus attached to a negative stereotype, the Tokugawa samurai, despising
any other warrior history than their own, continued to use the image to criticize the perceived
greed of religious institutions and to curb any challenges to their own political, social and
cultural superiority. That story is in itself fascinating, but what is perhaps most perplexing is how
21. Adolphson, The Gates of Power, 144–145; Gyokuyō, Jōan 3 (1173) 5/20, 6/21, 25, 27, 30, 7/1, 7, 12–15, 21; Tōnomine
ryakki, Jōan 2 (1172) 9/6, int. 12/24, Jōan 3/6/8.
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modern scholars bought the fabricated image of the sōhei wholesale. The notion of “religious
warfare” in Japan thus centered on monastic warriors dressed in monk robes, head cowls and
wooden clogs fighting in muddy battlefields mainly with their typical glaives (naginata).
Ludicrous as that image is, it remained so strong that even when common sense would have
dictated that such a battle attire would be highly impractical, or when both contemporary diaries
and later artistic depictions contradicted it, few scholars questioned it. From a personal perspec-
tive, seeing Matsudaira Ken struggling to stay on top of a horse while swinging a ten-foot
naginata replica as Benkei (?–1189), the loyal monk and retainer of Minamoto Yoshitsune
(1159–1189), in the 2005 NHK taiga dorama series truly felt like one of the low points in
Japanese film-making. In reality, those fighting for temples in premodern Japan were identical to
those fighting for nobles or the imperial court. They came from one of two groups: local land
managers and their retainers who had armed themselves to perform their duties and expand their
control, or mid- to low-level aristocrats, who armed themselves to make careers as provincial
officers or guards in the capital.
If we begin with the latter, it soon becomes clear that commanders of monastic forces were of
the same stock as those who led any other armed men. Indeed, they came from the same families,
such as the Minamoto, the Taira or the Fujiwara, descendants of the mid-level nobles that had
become “bridging figures” between the capital elites and local administrators and strongmen.22
About a dozen or so of those monastic commanders are known to us in historical records, but
none is better documented, and perhaps more infamous, than Shinjitsu (1086–?), who in one
source is noted as “Japan’s number one evil, martial monk.”23
A descendant of the Seiwa Minamoto, Shinjitsu came from a long line of military leaders, who
had served in various capacities in estate management and provincial administration. His father,
Minamoto no Yoriyasu (n.d.), was known as a “troublemaker” because of his attempts to
appropriate land for his own gains.24 Shinjitsu was not much different from his ancestors, except
that his master was the Fujiwara clan temple of Kōfukuji in Nara rather than a courtier or the
imperial court in Kyoto. Indeed, while Shinjitsu was involved in disputes that centered on his
monastery, he was no less a warrior than his predecessors. The question, of course, is if the
22. Jeffrey P. Mass first argued the central importance of these “bridging figures.” See his Warrior Government and “The
Kamakura Bakufu,” 49.
23. Sonpi bunmyaku, vol.3 , 162; Kōfukuji bettō sangō keizu, 27.
24. Sonpi bunmyaku, vol.3 , 162; Kōfukuji bettō sangō keizu, 27; Tsunoda Bun’ei, “Shōmu tennō haka,” in idem, Ōchō no meian:
Heian jidai shi no kenkyū, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Tōkyōdō shuppan, 1977), 339–340. It is worth noting that Shinjitsu was also a
direct descendant of the aforementioned Minamoto no Mitsunaka.
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identity of his master changed the way that he acted and fought, and how the world around him
perceived him.
In the early twelfth century, Kōfukuji had become an arena for competition between different
factions at the imperial court in Kyoto, mainly because the temple controlled many important
court rituals but also because it held numerous estates and branch institutions. For example, in
1129, the new retired emperor, Toba, who had gained control of the court following the death of
his grandfather, wanted to promote one of his monk-allies to a prominent position at Kōfukuji.
However, several clerics opposed the favoritism, which led to an attack on the unsuspecting
monk when he traveled back to Kyoto after an event in Nara. Toba, furious with this assault, sent
government warriors led by renowned military leaders to punish the “evil monks” (akusō),
resulting in the deposing of the head abbot, and the exile of several of the instigators. Although
Shinjitsu was not directly involved, as far as we can tell, he was also punished but soon pardoned
owing to the intervention of Kōfukuji’s secular patron, Fujiwara no Tadazane (1078–1162).25
Shinjitsu’s activities from 1137, when he was appointed assistant head administrator (gon no
jōza), reflect his rise through the ranks, aided in large by his military prowess, which he used to
increase Kōfukuji’s influence as well as his own assets. In 1139, Shinjitsu headed forces that first
opposed a newly appointed and rather unpopular head abbot, and later defended against a
retaliatory attack launched by the head abbot. Both sides counted experienced warriors and even
well known military leaders, but it was Shinjitsu’s forces that had the upper hand.26
Shinjitsu remained a central figure throughout the 1140s and the first half of the 1150s. The
peak may have come in 1148, when he was in charge of the temple in the absence of a head
abbot, something that was virtually unprecedented. Shinjitsu does not appear to have had much
training in Hossō doctrines or mastered any complicated religious rituals, but his support from
one of the Fujiwara leaders apparently was enough to allow him to effectively lead Kōfukuji for
three full years until a new head abbot was appointed.27 His career came to a halt in the Hōgen
Incident of 1156, when two feuding factions within both the imperial family and the Fujiwara
regental branch resorted to violence to resolve their competition for control of the imperial court.
Many military leaders were drawn into this court conflict, the first time in centuries that armed
men were used to settle a political dispute in Kyoto itself. Given his training and background,
one should perhaps not be surprised that Shinjitsu was one of the commanders called in to
25. Kōfukuji bettō shidai, 13–14; Chōshūki, Daiji 4 (1129) 11/11, 12, 21, 24, 28, 30; Chūyūki, Daiji 4/11/12, 25, 29.
26. Kōfukuji bettō shidai, 16–17; Nanto daishu jūrakuki, 325–327. 
27. Adolphson, The Teeth and Claws of the Buddha, 97.
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support the secular ally of his temple, Fujiwara no Tadazane (1078–1162). What is perhaps more
surprising is that a war tale notes that the monk-commander was to bring a full thousand out of
the sixteen hundred troops for the Tadazane side. Unfortunately for Tadazane, his generals seem
to have hesitated for too long and so his opponents struck first before Shinjitsu and his forces
could reach Kyoto. Shinjitsu returned to Nara without engaging the enemy forces, and was
subsequently neutralized as a leader within Kōfukuji.28 But his fate was no different from other
military commanders who chose the “wrong” side, inevitably drawn into the court competition
through their patrons.
Compared to Shinjitsu and other monk-commanders, there are few sources that offer details
about the rank-and-file clerics who engaged in violence. However, a careful examination of
historical records reveal that, despite many scholars’ attempts to pinpoint one group or another as
being equivalent to the sōhei, they came from diverse backgrounds. In general, we can distin-
guish between those who resided within the monastic complexes as members of the clergy and
those who resided at branches or in estates controlled by a temple. Among the clergy, a number
of terms were used to refer to those who took up arms—daishu (大衆 , “clergy”), dōshu (堂衆 ,
“hall clerics”), akusō (悪僧, “evil monks”) or jinnin (神人, “shrine people”)—but much of that
stemmed from confusion about their identity among diarists and chroniclers.29 The resident
clerics generally hailed from lower level groups of society, who took care of grounds keeping,
preparations for rituals and the general management of buildings and services. The terms used to
describe these groups could differ between monasteries, though akusō was generally reserved for
clerics who were seen as violating the order or acting against the wishes of the temple in general,
but I will return to that term in more detail later in this paper.
Armed supporters residing away from the monastery were identical to the warrior-administra-
tors and their retainers who served secular masters in various shōen. As long as they delivered
levies and managed the estate according to expectations, they received protection by their
patrons, which in turn enabled them to gain more strength in the local arena. On occasion, they
were called to support their patrons in the factional competition in the capital, at which time they
are noted in chronicles and diaries with different combinations of the character for “warrior”
(hei,兵), such as zuihei (随兵, “accompanying warriors”), gunpei (軍兵, “warrior bands”), heishi
(兵士 , “warriors”) or as bushi (武士 , “military men”). The most telling example involving
28. Hōgen Monogatari, in Nihon koten bungaku taikei, vol. 31, 85, 125; Heihanki, Hōgen 1 (1156) 7/11. 
29. Adolphson, The Teeth and Claws, 58–71. For a more in-depth treatment of the dōshu, see Adolphson, “The Dōshu: Clerics at
Work in Early Medieval Japanese Monasteries,” Monumenta Nipponica 67:2 (2012), 263–282.
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temples dates to the 1113 conflict between Enryakuji and Kōfukuji mentioned above, when one
of the nobles noted in his diary that “the clergy of the Southern Capital riot incessantly, assem-
bling warrior bands [gunpei] from Kinpusen and Yoshino, as well as estate and provincial
residents of Yamato. They all carry bows and arrows, following the lead of the Kōfukuji
clergy.”30 Other terms are as well used in contemporary sources, but whatever they are called,
there are no signs of any sōhei. Those who fought for temples were simply armed men, nothing
more and nothing less.
Finally, when it comes to the type of weapons used and warfare strategies, it should not be
difficult to understand that claims of “religious warfare” in premodern Japan based on weaponry
is grossly misplaced. Indeed, even idealized literary and pictorial sources depict monastic
warriors using the full range of weapons one would expect by any warrior. For example, the
Heike Monogatari repeatedly describes monastic warriors using bows and arrows, swords, dirks
as well as the naginata.31 There are additionally records of clerics who mastered the ultimate
skills among warriors, shooting arrows while riding a galloping horse. We see this on later
picture scrolls but also in a temple record, which indicate that novices at Tōdaiji displayed skills
of yabusame (rapid shooting from horseback) and kasagake (long distance shooting from
horseback), leaving no doubt as to the skills of these warriors. In picture scrolls, we find
mounted archers in a number of works, such as the Kasuga gongen kenki e (early fourteenth
century). Though some picture scrolls, especially those of later ages, tend to include head cowls
to distinguish monastic warriors from other fighters, numerous scrolls also show temple forces
looking exactly like secular forces.32
Additional similarities in warfare include the use of barricades and simple fortifications, which
were common in the siege and position warfare of the late Heian and Kamakura eras. These
barricades were not fortifications with wooden palisades, but more commonly simply piles of
debris, mounds and earth meant to slow down the advancement of troops, or for protection while
firing arrows. Even in terms of punishments, monasteries used the same kind, including execu-
tions to deter criminals and internal disturbances. In short, everything in the modus operandi of
monastic warriors reflects the activities, not of a specific group of religious warriors, but of the
emerging warrior class in general. Historical sources make it abundantly clear that the armed
30. Chūyūki, Eikyū 1 (1113) 4/14; DNS 3:14, 143–144. See also Adolphson, The Teeth and Claws, 71–78. 
31. See for example the fascinating description of Jōmyō Meishu in McCullough, The Tale of Heike, 153–154, 194–195. See also
Genpei seisuiki, 579.
32. Adolphson, The Teeth and Claws, 79–83, 132–135. For another telling example of non-sōhei like depictions of temple
warriors, see the Hōnen shōnin eden (Adolphson, The Teeth and Claws, 82).
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monastics were nothing like the coherent groups of sōhei shown in later sources. Rather, they
were simply part of an increased tendency to solve conflicts with the use of arms that occurred
across society from the tenth century and on.
The Ideological Framework
As should be obvious from the incidents accounted above, violence involving clerics cannot be
disengaged from the socio-political factionalism of the time. Indeed any attempt to separate the
spheres of court politics from religious competition and violence is doomed to misrepresent the
context and history of late Heian and Kamakura Japan. To be sure, there were minor conflicts
that seem to have little to do with any actions taken by members of the court elites, but such an
interpretation rests on the assumption that humans act in vacuum without any contextual factors.
In contrast, I would argue that the very setting of this era was based on cooperative rule that also
contained competition between the various elites, leading ultimately to members of the lower
echelons acting to promote their own interests, but with the patronage of their elite masters in
mind. The salient question here is not why specific violent events involving clerics occurred, but
rather what the mental framework, or the mentalité, of the age was like that allowed religious
institutions such a prominent role in this historical context.
At the most basic level, it is important to point out that religious rhetoric is surprisingly absent
concerning violence by Buddhist clerics. When we do find statements, they either deplore the
general decline of the state of affairs, or they are simply inconsistent, at times criticizing clerics
for carrying weapons, at times encouraging them to use them. Lacking evidence of condemna-
tions of religious violence on doctrinal grounds in Japan’s early medieval age, we must, how-
ever, ask if religious rhetoric was not used in the opposite way; i.e. to justify violence, but it is
difficult to find statements to that effect. Members of the traditional schools certainly accused the
newer schools that emphasized the superiority of Amida Buddha, for example, of being a
misguided form of Buddhism, but even in those cases, that rhetoric is mixed with concerns about
losing patrons, funding and religious appointments. The case of the Jōdo Shinshū believers and
their recruitment of commoners to fight for the faith seem to constitute one exception from the
premodern period, though it belongs to the late medieval era of the 15th and 16th centuries.
However, recent research has increasingly emphasized the non-religious rhetoric in the recruit-
ment and battle rhetoric, and so even here it seems to have been if not entirely non-existent, at
least played much less of a role than modern scholars assumed. The uprisings of the Warring
States Period were about taxation and local political control, and those headed by the believers of
13
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the True Pure Land sect were similar to other gekukujō (“the lower overturning those above”)
movements of their time.33
And, yet there was an ideological framework within which violence by clerics occurred.
During Japan’s early medieval age, there are in particular three sets of ideas that played a large
part in justifying clerics in armed conflicts, the precepts notwithstanding. First, while Buddhist
texts, including the Sutra of Brahma’s Net (Bonmōkyō), specifically prohibit the possession, use
of arms as well as resorting to violence, there was also a discourse within Buddhism about
deities using arms to battle evil beings or other threats. The prime examples here are of course
the Shitennō (the Four Deva Kings), frequently depicted with arms and fierce expressions, such
as can be seen among the statues at Tōdaiji and at many paintings. Rarely expressed in the texts
of the Heian and Kamakura periods, the very existence of these deities in the Buddhist pantheon
provided its armed clerics with at least a way around the strict prohibitions against arms and
killing.
But, in contrast to Europe, there was no evil “other” to fight in medieval Japan. As a political
entity, Japan was in many ways a state of the Buddha, with a plethora of Buddhist ceremonies
performed by different monastic centers for individual court families and the state at large.
Indeed, they outnumbered those that might be considered Shintō today. Of course, they were
performed by different schools, different temples and sponsored by different factions, but any
temple would be hard pressed to justify attacks on other temples from a doctrinal perspective
since they were all ultimately committed to protecting the state through Buddhism. This brings
us to a second ideology, which I would argue was the most fundamental and important founda-
tion in guiding on a principal level much of the interaction between temples and the imperial
court, between clerics and courtiers. It is known as the “mutual inter-dependence between the
Imperial and Buddhist Law,” or ōbō buppō soi, and it first appears in a tenth century document,
which explains that a violation of the Imperial Law was also a crime against the laws of Bud-
dhism. A more explicit case of co-dependence is made in an appeal filed by an estate manager
from Tōdaiji in 1053, where the complainant compared the laws of the state and Buddhism to the
two wings of a bird or the two wheels of a cart.34 The co-dependence of these spheres could
justify violence in times of a perceived decline, and Buddhism could be seen as the final outpost
of defense in protecting the imperial state. Such notions were especially strong in the late tenth
33. See for example, Carol Richmond Tsang, War and Faith: Ikkō ikki in Late Muromachi Japan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Asia Center, 2007).
34. Adolphson, The Gates of Power, 272; Hirata, Sōhei to bushi (find original?), 124–125; Heian ibun, volume 3, document 702,
Mino no kuni shōshi jūnin ra gesu, Tengi 1 (1053) /7 (pp. 834–835), Kuroda Toshio, Jisha seiryoku, 48.
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and eleventh centuries, when ideas of Buddhism’s decline (mappō, “the end of the law”) had
become common among the noble elites.
Violence associated with monasteries were thus linked to that decline, for which there was not
much one could do, or it could be interpreted as the final barrier of defense against a continued
decline. For this reason, comments in diaries about religious disturbances rarely speak of clerics
as breaking codes against violent behavior, but rather lament the general state of affairs as
reflected through such violations of order and the laws of the Buddha and the state.
The concept appears through the Kamakura age, and there is abundant evidence that it was
more than just a theoretical idea mentioned in a few documents. Courtiers were quite mindful
that any decline—material or in terms of religious rituals, for example—of any of the state-
sanctifying temples was either a reflection of a court in decline or a foreboding of it. The court’s
continuous support and willingness to ensure the wellbeing of its religious allies are evident in
the frequent reconstructions of damaged buildings throughout the Heian and Kamakura periods.
At times, not even the court could afford the reconstruction, as was the case with Tōdaiji after its
infamous destruction at the hands of the Taira in 1180, when general fund raising campaigns
took place across Japan to rebuild the state’s most imperial temple. But, it was for the sake of the
temple and the state that the funds were collected, so even in such cases, it reflects the wide-
spread belief in the mutual inter-dependence of the state and Buddhism.
That the monasteries and their inhabitants also subscribed to this ideology is hardly surprising.
In fact, it was this ideology that lay behind the practice of divine demonstrations (gōso), by
which the clergy would carry carts containing kami symbols from associated shrines to the
capital to protest a decision or policy made by the court. Such protests emerged in the late
eleventh century and they were frequent until the late fourteenth, when they lost their efficacy
with the warrior aristocracy in charge. Following the idea of the mutual dependence, any of the
carriages that may have been damaged during the protest was rebuilt at the court’s expense.
These protests were accordingly predicated on the elite temples being closely associated with the
welfare of the state, and so when decisions regarding promotion of monks, appointments of head
abbots or disputes over land rights were perceived to endanger the temple, its inhabitants would
equate the decline of their institution with the state of the court. And the court was frequently
forced to accede to the demands of the clergy since they feared that negligence of the elite
temples would make matters worse within the imperial court.35
The third idea is less known but none the less important. Based on an idea of divine rights of
35. Adolphson, The Gates of Power, 272–273.
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the larger community, there was a sense that a unanimous group was justified in its actions and
supported by the kami. Hailing from local beliefs and sometimes used by villages in opposing
what the inhabitants considered unfair practices, the idea of ichimi dōshin (一味同心), or “fel-
lows of one heart,” was adopted by monastic communities as well. In a world dominated by
hierarchies and vertical ties, community solidarity and majority opinions were not commonly
worth much. Such was the Heian and Kamakura periods, but monastic communities show some
remarkable exceptions in this regard. For example, noble ranks were the determining factors at
court, for major provincial appointments and anything in-between, but monastic organizations in
theory based their organizational rankings on years of service rather than social standing. Indeed,
for the first half of the Heian age, most promotions follow such principles. However, from the
late tenth century, more and more sons of nobles were taken to monasteries where they were put
on short-tracks to abbotships. By the late Heian and Kamakura ages, we find mainly head abbots
and abbots of noble rank leading religious institutions and important ceremonies. Still, the idea
that the clergy had certain rights even vis-à-vis their own masters remained central in the
ideological framework of this age, and the clergy used ichimi dōshin to declare that if there was
unanimous consent about specific issues or grievances, there was therefore divine justification
for the course of action proposed. At Kōfukuji, such divine rights were called Yamashina dōri
(Yamashina justice), named after the purported location of the temple when it was first
founded.36 The most telling example of this kind of group mentality may be an incident dating to
1142, when a group of armed Onjōji clerics ascended Mt. Hiei to wreak havoc and burn five
buildings at one of the monastic compounds there. Two ringleaders were detained and interro-
gated about the attack, but they defended themselves by claiming that they acted on behalf of the
entire clergy, invoking the idea of ichimi dōshin.37 The similarities of this kind of reasoning with
modern mob mentalities, as described by E. P. Thompson, is rather striking despite the chrono-
logical and geographical distances between such historical settings.38
It is in the context of ichimi dōshin that we must consider the term akusō (“evil monks”),
which is undoubtedly one of the most significant terms of this period. In contrast to the notion of
divine justice for an entire group, the term akusō was used to describe members who acted on
their own without the approval of the entire clergy. In the above noted attack on Enryakuji in
1142, the two ringleaders expressly attempted to avoid being labeled akusō by using the notion
36. Adolphson, The Teeth Claws of the Buddha, 64–65; Adolphson, The Gates of Power, 271–272.
37. Heian ibun 6, document 2471, “Onjōji sō Chōjun ra shinji ki,” Kōji 1 (1142) 5/8 (pp. 2073–2074); Honchō seiki, Kōji 1/3/17.
38. E.P. Thompson, Customs in Common, 188.
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of divine justice. In another incident from that same year, we find that fifteen “evil monks” from
Kōfukuji were exiled to the province of Mutsu in northern Japan for being rebellious.39 An
additional example is the Enryakuji monk Yūkei, who took the lead in freeing the popular abbot
Myōun as the court was taking him to exile in 1177. Yūkei is recorded as having put on arms and
carried a naginata as he led a select number of followers to ambush the procession.40
But not all akusō were armed, despite the tendency among modern scholars to equate akusō
with sōhei. In fact, a diary entry from 1104 indicates that they were not always seen as one and
the same. In the tenth month of that year, two military leaders were ordered “to secure the
western and eastern sides of Mt. Hiei, and to arrest evil monks and fellows carrying arms who
ascend the mountain.”41 The contrast here between merely evil monks, who may or may not be
armed, and fellows in general carrying arms reflects a clear notion that monks may be in the
“evil” category for a number of reasons, while the fellows ascending Mt. Hiei with arms were to
be arrested for their militant gear. Another way of better understanding the usage of the term is to
look at the Historiographical Institute’s database, which reveals that about one third of akusō
refers to the appropriation of harvests or intrusions in landed estates, while less than one fourth
can clearly be linked to the use of arms.42
The term akusō is thus far from an absolute term, but rather reflects biases of rulers and
courtiers writing at the time. And, indeed, the “evil” was not reserved for members of the cloth.
We find numerous compounds with the term, ranging from “evil bands” (akutō), “evil people”
(akunin) to “evil deeds” (akugyō). Its usage may even appear rather arbitrary since we find the
same people on both sides of the divide. For example, the aforementioned Shinjitsu was labeled
an evil monk, but was nevertheless recruited by one of the factions in the Hōgen Incident. Had
his record been different if his faction had won? Likely. Similarly, in the Genpei War of 1180–
85, the anti-Taira faction called upon temples, such as Onjōji, to step in militarily numerous
times, but are not referred to as being “evil” in those instances. An even more telling example
may be the Ashikaga shogunate, which encouraged Jōdo Shinshū believers to rebel against a
local warlord, but some twenty years earlier had in fact ordered the sect’s head to stop any such
activities.43 In short, when it suited the rulers or the patrons, temple forces were obviously not
called “evil,” so in the end, such labels depended entirely on the circumstances and the perspec-
39. Taiki, Kōji 1 (1142) 8/3.
40. Genpei Seisuki, 110–111; McCullough, The Tale of the Heike, 61; Adolphson, The Teeth and Claws, 62–63.
41. Chūyūki, Chōji 1 (1104) 10/30.
42. See my search done in 2004, cited in Adolphson, The Teeth and Claws, 63 and fn. 15, p. 173.
43. Carol Richmond Tsang, War and Faith.
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tive of the dominating or victorious factions in Kyoto. Given such conditions, it also stands to
reason that religious rhetoric would not have played a major role from the perspective of the
nobles since armed monastics were just as often recruited as they were criticized.
Conclusions
Modern observers have frequently condemned violent activities by clerics in premodern Japan,
but contemporary sources do not provide any support for the idea that “religious violence” was
somehow less acceptable or worse than any other violence. In fact, in early medieval Japan, there
was no such thing as “religious violence,” since it was not viewed differently from other vio-
lence, and there was no way of separating one from the other since they ultimately were con-
cerned with the same issues: patronage, factionalism, rankings and assets. What was condemned
rather were activities that were considered upstaging to the order or “illegal” from the perspec-
tive of those in power.
Indeed, criticism of violent clerics on doctrinal grounds is rare. Some monks, such as Ryōgen,
undoubtedly felt that many monastic members were not following the precepts or the rules, but
even in such cases, we see few references to doctrinal statements. Rather, the main concern is
that of order and respect of hierarchical structures, the same that we find in noble diaries of the
period. Criticism of armed clerics cannot be seen as blanked disapproval of religious violence,
but rather as part of a broader understanding of order and harmony in the court-centered polity of
Heian and Kamakura Japan.
It is equally futile to look for “religious warfare” in premodern Japan.44 Those who fought
came from the same category of lower-level menial workers or land administrators. Contrary to
the Tokugawa age, warfare and the carrying of arms were not privileges of a single class in
Heian and Kamakura times, but rather anyone with the inclination do so could engage in armed
conflicts. What brought such people into the at times intense factionalism between the elites in
the capital were mid-level aristocrats, who had taken on leadership roles in land and temple
administration. Among those who fought, be it for nobles or temples, they emerged from the
same setting, sharing resources, fighting techniques and sometimes even the same surnames. The
creation of the sōhei—monastic warriors with distinct backgrounds and warfare strategies—is
44. While scholars today seem to acknowledge the futility of separating religious violence of warfare from other types of
violence, the continued emphasis on the constructed sōhei indicates that some scholars are still committed to that paradigm.
For a recent example of the “religious warfare” approach, see Jerryson, Michael K. and Juergensmeyer, Mark. Eds. Buddhist
Warfare (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
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thus a later construct designed to elevate a more “pure” version of the warrior class we now refer
to as the samurai. Since those who did take up arms for their temples and shrines were of such
diverse backgrounds, but usually connected to and acted in the name of their master, it would be
more appropriate to talk about monastic violence, assuming that we understand that it refers to
those who fought and not necessarily to a specific mode of warfare.
In the end, it is the ideological context of violence that informs us best about the conditions of
premodern Japan. The co-existence of cases where the use of arms by clerics was criticized and
the very same members were praised for their violent acts indicate an ambiguous and perhaps
malleable setting. In part, it derives from Buddhism itself, since there was a notion that allowed
members of temples and shrines to legitimately take up arms in defense of Buddhism, and in its
extension of the state itself, but in Japan, it was less based on legal or moral principles regarding
violence than on a general desire for order in society. If monks and their retainers were criticized
for violent behavior, it was because they had chosen the wrong side within the imperial order,
and if they were praised, it was because they had sided with the winning side in the factional
struggles at court. As long as the imperial court and the Law of the Buddha were seen as co-
dependent and members of a community could claim divine justice based on ichimi dōshin, there
were no doctrinal obstacles to armed clerics and monasteries. The notion of “religious violence”
was foreign to both nobles and commoners of the medieval age, and the concept itself belongs
more to the modern world than the times preceding it.
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